ASME NML-1-2019 pdf download
ASME NML-1-2019 pdf download.Rules for the Movement of Loads Using Overhead Handling Equipment in Nuclear Facilities.
DEFINITIONS cascading failures: a process in a system ofinterconnected parts in which the failure ofone or a few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on. design ratedtorque: thetorque requiredto holdthe design rated load of the hoist at the point of brake application. double-rigging arrangement: a system in which two inde- pendent sets of load-carrying elements, each capable of carryingthe load, are used to connectthe load to the over- head handling equipment. emergencyresponseplan:asetofactionsnecessarytomiti- gate the consequences ofthe worstpossible outcomes ofa load-handling accident. engineered temporary lift assembly (ETLA): specially designed lifting equipment that is not general purpose but has a special temporary intended purpose. These assemblies are not standard design items and are not available fromacommercialsource, andthere is no gener- ally accepted consensus standard applicable to the equip- ment. Examples of ETLAs include special gin poles and derricks; special crane supports such as runways or over- head gantry columns and frames; and special load-han- dling equipment such as up-end and down-end devices and jacking towers (unless used with the guidance of the applicable volume ofASME B30). ETLAs are required for lifts that cannotbe accomplished with standard lifting devices. essential safety function (ESF): a function performed by a plantsystem, structure, orcomponentthatis necessaryto remove decayheatfrom irradiatedfuel, provide shielding, contain radioactive material, orcontrol nuclearreactivity. For the purposes of this Standard, ESFs are defined as follows: (a) maintaining adequate decay heat removal. (b) maintaining reactor coolant system and spent fuel pool inventory necessary for adequate shielding, removal of decay heat, and containment of radioactive material. This may be accomplished by preventing leakage from the reactor vessel (during refueling) and spent fuel pool in excess of safety-related makeup capability.
minimum liftheight: the smallestdistance thata load must be lifted above a surface in order for the crane’s safety features to engage and stop the load should the hoist fail to hold the load. This calculation shall evaluate factors such as wire rope stretch, time to detect uncom- manded lowering, brake response time, energy dissipa- tion, and additional distance needed as a safety margin. Mitigating Systems Performance Index: performance indi- cator for five nuclear power plant emergency systems: emergency AC power, high-pressure injection, heat removal, residual heat removal, and support cooling. movementsafetyenvelope: the additional volume arounda given crane, load, and rigging configuration that accounts forthe detection and mitigation ofunintended movement. Thisenvelopeislessthanorequaltothefacilityacceptable excursion limit (FAEL) established for the crane design. OEM: original equipment manufacturer. overhead handling equipment: permanent cranes, temporary cranes, mobile cranes, and manually operated hoistingequipmentthatare used to hoistaload orto hoist and move a load from one location to another. owner: the organization legally responsible for the construction and/or operation of a nuclear facility, including but not limited to one who has applied for or been granted a construction permit or operating license by the regulatory authority having lawful jurisdic- tion. planned engineered lifts: lifts in excess of the rated load that are required from time to time on a limited basis for specific purposes such as new construction or major repairs. predictive maintenance: the use of techniques such as thermal, vibration, and lubrication analyses to predict the service life of a component or system. preventive maintenance: maintenance techniques imple- mented to ensure safe and reliable operation ofoverhead handling equipment. Lifts with High probability factors shall not be performed until actions are taken to mitigate those factors. For other lifts that approach a High probability, consideration should be given to mitigating multiple Medium probability factors in order to reduce the risk of the lift. High probability factors include but are not limited to the following: (1) The weight of load has not been calculated or measured. (2) The lift involves a mobile crane setup on terrain that has not been evaluated and determined suitable for expected loading. (3) The load has an unknown or shifting center of gravity. (4) Theliftinvolves liftingdevices, rigginghardware, or slings without safe-working-load markings. (5) The lift is performed with the crane working clearances to adjacent electrical power lines within +10% ofminimum clearances specified in the ASME stan- dard for the respective crane. (6) Sling angles are less than 30 deg above hori- zontal.
