ASME NQA.TR-2020 pdf download

ASME NQA.TR-2020 pdf download.Evolution of Quality Assurance Principles and Requirements in the U.S. Nuclear Industry.
AEC quality management policy for nuclear weapons complex activities was first documented in the AEC’s Santa Fe Operations Office (SFO) Weapon Quality Policy, QC-1. Issued in April 1954, QC-1 predated MIL- Q-9858A, 1 the widely used DOD specification for military quality assurance programs that was issued in 1959. TheinitialeditionofQC-1 includedthefollowingquality control and inspection principals and requirements: (a) specification and drawing control (b) quality control procedures (c) control of inspection gauging and test equipment (d) production tooling accuracy (e) in-process inspection and records (f) control of special processes (g) SFO/DOE source inspection (h) raw material and deviation control QC-1 prescribed general principles and practices for AEC–SFO acceptance inspection of nuclear weapons systems and auxiliaryequipmentfrom prime contractors. Itrequired weapons program prime contractors to estab- lish and implement quality control systems to ensure, among other things, that nuclear weapons materials metminimumqualitystandards. SFO expected these prin- ciples and requirements to be applied also to ordnance plants operated by DOD on the behalf of SFO and to arsenals that performed work for the SFO under agree- ments with DOD.
In 1982, the DOE AssistantSecretaryfor MilitaryAppli- cations defined, 2 and in 1989 redefined 3 in greater detail, the quality assurance policy for the DOE nuclear weapons complex. This policy required the execution and mainte- nance of procedures that – provided control, through plans and actions, over activities affecting quality to an extent consistent with defined programmatic or organizational objectives – had objective, measurable means to ensure their effectiveness, which were required to be used bymanage- ment for regular assessments – emphasizedcontinuousimprovementinallactivities, including both support and operational organizations – applied appropriate elements of recognized stan- dards QC-1 was revised numerous times from its initial issue in 1954 through 2004. In 2013, QC-1, Revision 10, was replaced by National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Policy Letter NAP-24. QC-1 and NAP-24A addressed changes and additional DOE weapon quality policy and quality assurance requirements. Thus, for example, QC-1, Revision 6, issued in 1992, added quality system requirements for training of manufac- turing, inspection, and test personnel, and for quality improvement, error prevention versus detection, and nonconformance costs.
In 1992, the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) issued a new standard, QC-2, to complement QC-1 for nuclear weapons research, development, and testing. QC-1, Revision 9, issued in late 1998, incorporated into QC-1 the newer quality assurance requirements of QC-2 for nuclear weapons research, design, development, procurement, production, dismantlement, maintenance, stockpile evaluation, and disassembly and disposal. From QC-1’s inception in 1954 to the currentNAP-24A, policy, principles, and requirements have placed maximum responsibility and accountability on – nuclear weapons program prime contractors to maintain effective quality control systems – the AEC/DOE not only to conduct surveillance and acceptance inspections that focus on functional quality evidence presented by the prime contractors, but also to verify this quality evidence InFebruary2004, the DOE/NNSAissued QC-1, Revision 10, superseding Revision 9. QC-1, Revision 10, contained the following significant changes for organizations that were required to complywith DOE weapon qualitypolicy: – change in ownership ofQC-1 from AL to DOE/NNSA Headquarters DP – new requirement for a management program (quality assurance program or weapon quality assurance program) to be submitted to DOE/NNSA for approval – major emphasis on a risk-based qualitymanagement system for decision making – greater emphasis on quality metrics QC-1, Revision 10, was restructured along the lines of ASME NQA-1–2000 to ensure that QC-1 could be imple- mented using ASME NQA-1. DOE/NNSA expanded the scope to include weapons work conducted by the federal organization and the management controls beyond hardware QC. Another major change made it clear that QC-1 was the DOE/NNSA method for imple- menting DOE O 414.1A and the DOE Nuclear Safety Management Rule, 10 C.F.R 830, Subpart A. All federal and contractor work relating to nuclear weapons was now covered by the DOE/NNSA quality assurance Order, Rule, and contract direction.